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MARITAL RAPE AND RELATED SEXUAL OFFENCES:
A REVIEW OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
PART XII OF THE CRIMES ORDINANCE
U
Robyn Emerton'
A recent bill in Hong Kong proposes a number of amendments to the offence of
rape and other related sexual offences as they apply to married persons. Part A of
this article discusses the proposed amendments to the offence of rape and examines
the case law under the analogous English legislation, with a particular focus on
the House of Lords' decision of R v R [19921 1 AC 599 and its relevance to Hong
Kong law. Part B considers the effect of the proposed amendments on a number of
related sexual offences, in particular the effect of the new definition of "unlawful
sexual intercourse". It is argued that, whilst the amendments to rape and several
other key offences are to be warmly welcomed, this new definition is likely to cause
confusion and may also reduce the protection currently afforded to certain categories
of women against sexual offences committed by their husbands, thus necessitating
further review and reform.
Introduction
On 10 July 2001, the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2001 (the
"Bill") was introduced into the Hong Kong Legislative Council.' Part V of the
Bill sets out a number of amendments to Part XII (Sexual and Related Offences)
of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap 200), which are primarily intended to make
clear that marital rape is an offence and to ensure that all other sexual offences
apply to non-consensual intercourse between married persons.
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After discussing the background to the Bill, this article examines the pro-
tection currently afforded to women and children by the Crimes Ordinance
in respect of sexual offences committed against them by their husbands. It
then considers the effect that the main proposals under the Bill will have on
this position. Finally, a number of areas requiring further review and reform
are highlighted.
Hong Kong's International Obligation to Combat Violence Against Women
The genesis of the proposed amendments appears to have been Hong Kong's
obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women (the "CEDAW Convention"), which was ex-
tended to Hong Kong by the United Kingdom in 1996.'
Under the CEDAW Convention, the Hong Kong government is obliged to
"pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating
discrimination against women",4 which is defined to include "any distinction
... based on sex which has the effect ... of impairing or nullifying the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of
equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms"'
(emphasis added).
Whilst the CEDAW Convention contains detailed provisions on the dif-
ferent types of discrimination which require elimination, it makes no express
reference to the issue of sexual or other violence against women. However,
the position was clarified in 1992, when the monitoring body of the CEDAW
Convention, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women (the "CEDAW Committee"), issued its General Recommendation
No 19 (Violence against Women).' This expressly states that discrimination
includes gender-based violence, which, in turn, is described as "violence that
is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women
disproportionately" and includes "acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual
harm or suffering".' As emphasised by the CEDAW Committee, the effect of
1249 UNTS 13, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 18 Dec 1979 by resolution 34/
180. The People's Republic of China agreed that the CEDAW Convention would continue to apply
to Hong Kong after sovereignty was transferred to it by the United Kingdom on 1 July 1997, by
notification to the United Nations Secretary General, dated 10 June 1997. See the rich resources
available on "CEDAW in Hong Kong" on the website of the Centre for Comparative and Public
Law, University of Hong Kong at: http://www.hku.hk/ccpl/cedaw/index.html. The CEDAW Con-
vention and related documentation are also available online at the website of the United Nations
Division for the Advancement of Women at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.
htm (sites visited 10 Oct 2001).
4 CEDAW Convention, Art 2.
5 Ibid., Art 1.
6 UN Doc CEDAW/C/1991/L/1/Add.15(1992), available at the website of the United Nations Divi-
sion for the Advancement of Women at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recomm.htm
(site visited 10 Oct 2001).
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such violence is to seriously undermine women's ability to enjoy and
exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality
with men.'
The Hong Kong government is therefore obliged under the CEDAW Con-
vention to take all appropriate measures to eliminate gender-based violence,
including violence committed by private persons,' and is specifically recom-
mended to "ensure that laws against family violence and abuse, rape, sexual
assault and other gender-based violence give adequate protection to all women,
and respect their integrity and dignity"'o (emphasis added).
It is against this background that the CEDAW Committee, in making its
concluding comments in March 1999 on Hong Kong's initial report under
the CEDAW Convention," "note[d] with concern that marital rape is not
considered a criminal offence in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion" 2 and "urge[d] the amendment of existing legislation to include marital
rape as a criminal offence"."
The Process of Legislative Reform
Following the CEDAW Committee's comments, the issue was taken up one
year later, in May 2000, by the Legislative Council Panel on the Adminis-
tration of Justice and Legal Services (the "Panel"). The Panel expressed
concern that the offence of rape under section 118 of the Crimes Ordi-
nance might be interpreted to apply only to intercourse outside the bounds
of matrimony, and requested the Administration to consider whether
the legislation should be amended to make clear that marital rape is
an offence. The Administration subsequently issued a Consultation Paper
in October 2000, setting out its initial recommendations for legislative
amendment in relation to both the offence of rape and other sexual
offences between husband and wife. In January 2001, the Administration
issued a report and commentary on the responses it had received on the
Ibid., para 6.
8 General Recommendation No 19 (n 6 above), para 7.
9 CEDAW Convention, Art 2(e). See also General Recommendation No 19 (n 6 above), para 9.
10 General Comment No 19 (n 6 above), para 24(b).
1 The report is available at the website of the Health and Welfare Bureau, which houses Hong Kong's
new Women's Commission, at: http://www.info.gov.hk/hwb/english/ARCHIVE/INDEX.HTM (site
visited 10 Oct 2001).
12 This was not strictly true since (as will be discussed in detail below, p 4 20) the Hong Kong courts (at
least technically) would be legally bound by the English House of Lords' decision in R v R [1992] 1
AC 599 (HL(E)), 614. This held that all non-consensual sexual intercourse between married persons
constitutes rape. However, the CEDAW Committee's comment is significant in that it indicates
confusion amongst those reporting to it as to the correct position, as well as validly highlighting the
lack of clarity in the legislation.
'3 UN Doc C/1999/l/L 1/Add 7, para 73, available at the website of the Centre for Comparative and
Public Law, University of Hong Kong at: http://www.hku.hk/ccpl/cedaw/cedawhkconccomments.
html and the website of the Health and Welfare Bureau at: http://www.info.gov.hk/hwb/english/
ARCHIVE/INDEX.HTM (sites visited 10 Oct 2001).
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Consultation Paper." It continued an active dialogue with a number of
interested parties as it refined its proposals, putting a second working draft
before the Panel on 24 April 2001. Its final proposals appeared in the form
of the Bill in June 2001.
Part A: Proposals Relating to the Offence of Rape (section 118)
Under section 118(3) of the Crimes Ordinance, as it currently stands, a man
commits rape if:
"(a) he has unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman who at the time of
the intercourse does not consent to it; and
(b) at that time he knows she did not consent to the intercourse or he
was reckless as to whether she consents to it" (emphasis added).
The Bill proposes to delete the word "unlawful" from section 118(3)(a),
and to add an express provision that sexual intercourse between a husband
and his wife falls within subsection (3)(a). These amendments will effec-
tively bring Hong Kong law back in line with the position under English law,
on which the legislation was historically based.
Historical Background
The statutory definition of rape contained in section 118(3) of the Crimes
Ordinance was introduced into the Ordinance in 1978, tracking the defini-
tion introduced in England into section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956
by the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976. In both cases, this was the
first time that rape had been defined by statute.
Following its enactment in England, the new statutory definition of rape
(which stated that "a man commits rape if he has unlawful sexual intercourse
with a woman who at the time of the intercourse does not consent to it")
provoked considerable debate within both academic and judicial circles as to
whether parliament, by using the phrase "unlawful sexual intercourse", had
intended that the offence of rape apply only to sexual intercourse outside
marriage, with the effect that a husband would be immune from a charge of
rape against his wife, regardless of the circumstances.
1 Consultation Paper: Marital Rape and Related Sexual Offences and Summary and Consideration of Re-
sponses to the Consultation Paper on Marital Rape and Related Sexual Offences, copies on file with the
author. (Unfortunately, neither of these documents is available online at the Department of Justice's
website.)
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This so-called "marital rape exemption" had in fact been established some
200 years earlier at common law, but had since been whittled down by the
courts. The origins of the exemption are invariably traced back to Sir Mat-
thew Hale, who declared in 1736 that a wife gave implied consent to sexual
intercourse on marriage, which she could not subsequently retract:
"the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his
lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the
wife hath given herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot
retract".' 5
Whilst Hale's proposition was not supported by any authorities, 6 in time, it
became firmly entrenched in the English common law. It was only 150 years
later, with the 1889 case of R v Clarence," that the blanket nature of the mari-
tal rape exemption began to be questioned by the English courts. In that case,
Wills J, whilst agreeing with the majority that the husband was protected by
the marital rape exemption in the case before them, stated that he did not
believe that "as between married persons, rape is impossible"," and Field J, in
his dissenting opinion, said that "there may, I think, be many cases in which a
wife may lawfully refuse intercourse".19 Another 60 years later, starting with
the case of R v Clarke" in 1949, the courts began to develop exceptions to the
marital rape exemption, with the consequence that a wife's implied consent to
sexual intercourse would be deemed to be retracted inter alia by a judicial sepa-
ration order,' a decree nisi of divorce22 and a non-molestation order.23 In these
circumstances, her husband could be found guilty of rape.
When the statutory definition of rape was introduced in England in 1976,
the courts generally took the view that parliament could not have intended
to override the established common law exceptions to the marital rape
exemption, and continued to apply those exceptions. Indeed, in some cases,
'5 1 Hale Pleas of the Crown 629.
16 Claire Glasman argues strongly that: "No legislation ever granted immunity, nor is there any basis for
it in common law. Sir Matthew Hale, a 17th century witch-hunting judge, stated - in a book, not
even a judgment - that marriage entails irrevocable consent, and one judge after another has main-
tained the legal fiction" (1991) 141 NLJ 395.
17 [1889] 22 QBD 23.
18 Ibid., at 33.
19 Ibid., at 57.
20 [1949] 2 All ER 448.
21 Ibid.
22 Reg v O'Brien (Edward) [19741 3 All ER 663, at 665 per Park J.
23 R v Steele [1976] 65 Cr App R 22, at 25 per Lord Lane CJ. See also Lord Lane CJ's brief summary of the
historical background of the marital rape exemption in R v R [1992] i AC (CA) 599, at 602-605 and
further J. L. Barton, "The Story of Marital Rape" (1992) 108 LQR 272 and Melisa J. Anderson,
"Lawful Wife, Unlawful Sex - Examining the Effect of the Criminalization of Marital Rape in En-
gland and the Republic of Ireland" [19981 27 GA ] Int'l & Comp L 139, 149-152.
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such exceptions were refined and expanded,24 with the effect that the marital
rape exemption was further whittled down. However, as none of these cases
reached the House of Lords, the issue was never finally determined.
The House of Lords' Decision in R v R
Finally, in 1991, a case of marital rape reached the House of Lords. In its land-
mark decision in R v R," the House of Lords abolished the marital rape exemption
in its entirety, unanimously upholding the decision of the Court of Appeal.
In delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal in R v R,26 Lord Lane
CJ set out three possible interpretations of the word "unlawful" in the statu-
tory definition of rape: first, the "literal solution" that the offence was limited
to sexual intercourse outside marriage and that a husband therefore had full
immunity against a charge of rape against his wife; second, the "compromise
solution" that the word "unlawful" was to be construed so as to preserve the
exceptions to the husband's immunity which had developed at common law,
and to allow further exceptions as the occasion arose; and third, the "radical
solution" to hold that the word "unlawful" was surplusage, and to abolish the
marital immunity entirely.27 The Court of Appeal opted for the "radical
solution", holding that Hale's proposition that a wife giving implied consent
to sexual intercourse on marriage was a "common law fiction" which had
become "anachronistic and offensive".28 It concluded that "the time has now
arrived when the law should declare that a rapist remains a rapist subject to
the criminal law, irrespective of his relationship with his victim"."
The House of Lords, whose judgment was delivered by Lord Keith of Kinkel,
fully agreed with this position, finding that "in modern times the supposed
marital exception in rape forms no part of the law of England". 0 Since it was
"clearly unlawful to have sexual intercourse with any woman without her
consent", the use of the word "unlawful" in section 1 of the Sexual Offences
Act added nothing and was "mere surplusage"."
Whilst the end result, ie the complete abolition of the marital rape
exemption, was, with very few exceptions welcomed,32 considerable concern
24 See, for example, R v Roberts [1986] Crim LR 188, where it was held that a formal deed of separation,
which did not contain a specific non-cohabitation or non-molestation clause, was sufficient to re-
voke the wife's implied consent to marital intercourse. However, other courts took the view that it
was not open to them to build further on the exceptions to the marital rape exemption since the
1976 Act had "defined the common law as it stood at the time of the passing of the Act" which
"precluded any up-to-dated declaration of the state of the common law", R v C [1991] 1 All ER 755,
at 767 per Rougier J, as cited by Lord Lane in R v R [1992] 1 AC (CA) 599, at 608-609.
25 [1992] 1 AC 599 (HL(E)).
26 [1992] 1 AC 599 (CA).
27 Ibid., at 263-265.
28 Ibid., at 611, B.
29 Ibid., at 611, E.
30 Ibid., at 623, B.
31 Ibid., at 622, H, to 623, B.
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was expressed at the time that the House of Lords had acted beyond its judi-
cial powers in R v R, and indeed had come "perilously close to creating a new
criminal offence".33 Indeed, both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords
in R v R had anticipated these concerns. However, the House of Lords held
that it was not necessary to refer the matter to parliament, since this was not
"the creation of a new offence" but "the removal of a common law fiction
which ha[d] become anachronistic and offensive", and that "it was the court's
duty to act upon it".34
In the midst of this debate, the appellant in R v R brought a case before
the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that, as he had been protected
by the marital rape exemption at the time he committed the offence, his
conviction and sentence for rape constituted retrospective punishment and
was therefore contrary to Article 7 of the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.3 ' The European Court
held that there had been no violation of Article 7, since it was of the view
that the English common law had evolved to a stage where the abolition of
the marital rape exemption was reasonably foreseeable.3 1 Moreover, the Eu-
ropean Court held that the abolition of the immunity was "in conformity not
only with a civilised concept of marriage, but also, and above all, with the
fundamental objectives of the Convention, the very essence of which is re-
spect for human dignity and human freedom".
Any remaining concerns were, however, stilled when the UK parliament
decided to amend section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences Act to reflect the House
of Lords' decision in R v R. The amendment deleted the word "unlawful" from
the phrase "unlawful sexual intercourse" in the definition of rape, as well as
from two other related offences, namely procuring sexual intercourse by threats
or false pretences (sections 2 and 3). The latter have their equivalents in sec-
tions 119 and 120 of the Crimes Ordinance (and will be discussed further below).
32 One ardent critic of this decision was Olanville Williams, who, commenting in the context of the
English Law Commission's earlier proposal to abolish the marital rape exemption, expressed the view
that it was "too extreme to extend the law of rape to cohabiting husbands", as "a charge of rape is too
powerful (and even self-destructive) a weapon to put in the wife's hands", "The Problem of Domestic
Rape" (1991) 141 NLJ 205, 206.
3 Marianne Giles, "Judicial Law-Making in the Criminal Courts: the Case of Marital Rape" [1992]
Crim LR 407, 410. See also Ian Dennis, "Marital Rape" (1993) 46(1) CLP 39, 41-42.
3 Lord Keith of Kinkel, citing Lord Lane CJ with approval, [1992] 1 AC (HL(E)) 599, at 623C.
3 European Court of Human Rights, CR v United Kingdom, judgment of 22 Nov 1995, Series A, No
335-C. (See also European Court of Human Rights, CS v United Kingdom, judgment of 22 Nov 1995,
Series A, No 335-B on the same point.)
36 Ibid., at paras 34 and 41.
3 Ibid., at para 42. For a full discussion of the issues raised before the European Court, see Stephanie
Palmer, "Rape in Marriage and the European Convention on Human Rights" (1997) 5(1) Feminist
Legal Studies 91. See also C. Osborne, "Article 7 and the Marital Rape Exemption" (1996) 4 EHRLR
406, who argues that the European Court's conclusions in this case, however socially desirable, were
legally incorrect.
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The Effect of R v R on Hong Kong Law
The House of Lords' decision in R v R is (at least theoretically) legally bind-
ing on the Hong Kong courts. This is because Article 18 of the Basic Law,
which came into effect on the transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong to the
People's Republic of China on 1 July 1997, provides that the laws in force in
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be "the laws previously
in force in Hong Kong as provided for in Article 8". These are in turn defined
in Article 8 to include "the common law"."8 The date for determining which
laws were "previously in force" for the purposes of Article 18, whilst not ad-
dressed in the Basic Law, was clarified by the Court of Appeal in HKSAR v
Ma Wai Kwan David, which held that, as "the Basic Law came into effect on
1 July 1997 ... [t]he only logical and in fact proper conclusion is that 30 June
1997 is the cut-off date."' 9 Therefore, as a pre-1 July 1997 decision, R v R is
clearly binding on the Hong Kong courts.
There is also encouraging dicta to this effect in HKSAR v Chan Wing
Hung,40 in which the Hong Kong Court of Appeal considered the meaning of
"unlawful" in the context of section 119 of the Crimes Ordinance (procuring
an unlawful sexual act by threats or intimidation). Power VP remarked that
the Court of Appeal "incline[d] to the view that it would be proper to follow
the course adopted in R v R ... , in which Lord Keith said that the word
[unlawful] should be 'treated as being mere surplusage in this enactment"'"
although on the facts (the parties in this case were not married), Power VP
determined that it was "not in the present case necessary to go further than to
hold following the judgment of Donovan J in R v Chapman ... that unlawful
in the context means illicit, that is outside the bounds of matrimony". 42
Notwithstanding the dicta in HKSAR v Chan Win Hung, there remains
a risk that the Hong Kong courts might decide not to follow R v R. First, as
a matter of law, it would be open to the Court of Final Appeal (being the
ultimate court of appeal in Hong Kong) to determine that R v R was de-
cided wrongly and to depart from the decision. This is not beyond the realms
of possibility, given the criticisms made of R v R at the time. Indeed, Power
VP made reference to such criticisms in HKSAR v Chan Wing Hung, stating
that "Lord Keith was conscious that it might be suggested that the court
was usurping the power of the legislature ... as indeed are we" (emphasis
added)." Second, the Court of Final Appeal has held that it is not obliged
38 This is subject to a number of limitations which are not relevant here.
39 [1997] 2 HKC 315, per Chan CJHC at 329, F-G.
40 [1997] 3 HKC 472.
41 Ibid., at 475, G-H.
42 Ibid., at 475, H-1.
41 [1997] 3 HKC 472, at 475, H-I.
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to follow pre-1 July 1997 House of Lords' decisions, without citing any par-
ticular legal basis for this decision. This was in Tang Siu Man v HKSAR,44
where the Court of Final Appeal did not hesitate to depart from a 1996
decision of the House of Lords which was directly on point. As one com-
mentator remarked, the Court of Final Appeal simply assumed rather than
argued that it was no longer bound by this earlier decision.45 Citing Tang
Sui Man with approval in Bank of East Asia Lt v Tsien Wui Marble Factory
Ltd and Others,46 Nazareth PJ, having first referred to Article 8 of the Basic
Law, nevertheless took the view that "the Court would not be bound by
decisions of the House of Lords in identifying and developing the Common
Law of Hong Kong". However, he then added that "it may be thought,
however, that this Court would not depart from the law as it applied imme-
diately before 1 July 1997 without good reason".4
Given this background, the proposed amendment to the definition of rape
in section 118(3) of the Crimes Ordinance is clearly to be welcomed." By
deleting the word "unlawful" from the phrase "unlawful sexual intercourse"
in section 118 (and also, perhaps superfluously, adding an express provision
to the effect that sexual intercourse includes intercourse between a husband
and wife), it will be made absolutely clear that the offence of rape applies
regardless of the marital status of the parties. This approach will put to rest
any uncertainty as to whether or not the Hong Kong courts will follow the
House of Lords' decision in R v R. Legal issues aside, the proposed amend-
ment is also a clear and welcome affirmation, as a matter of public policy, of
society's condemnation of marital rape.
Part B: Related Sexual Offences
Introduction
The more difficult challenge faced by the Administration, and the area
in which opinion during the consultation process was most divided, was
how the amendment to section 118 could be achieved without adversely
affecting the application of other sexual offences to married persons. The
Administration's concern was that if the word "unlawful" was deleted from
section 118 but not from any other sections, the expressio unius rule would
apply. On the basis of this rule, the courts would be likely to determine
44 1199811 HKC 371.
45 Yash Ghai, Hong Kong's New Constitutional Order: The Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty and the Basic
Law (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999), 2nd edn, p 370, n 14.
46 [2000] 1 HKC 1.
4 Ibid., at 91, B-C.
48 Indeed, a firm consensus emerged during the consultation process that the amendment was necessary,
or at least desirable.
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that, wherever the word "unlawful" was retained, it was intended to bear its
traditional meaning of "outside marriage". Thus, married women would be
deprived of the protection of the law in relation to all sexual offences other
than rape.49 This is a valid concern, given that the Administration was not
mandated to delete the word "unlawful" from any other sections in the
Crimes Ordinance." Indeed, the selective deletion of the term "unlawful"
in the English legislation has led some academics to conclude that where
the term remains, it is to bear its traditional meaning of "outside marriage"
(although this has yet to be tested by the courts). Thus, according to Smith
and Hogan:
"'Unlawful' remains in numerous other sections of the 1956 Act, includ-
ing ss.4 (administering drugs to obtain intercourse), 5 (intercourse with a
girl under 13), 6 (intercourse with a girl under 16) and 7 (intercourse with
a defective). It seems clear that (with some possible exceptions) a man
cannot commit these offences by having intercourse with his wife ... The
selective repeal of "unlawful" indicates that the draftsman and the gov-
ernment were well aware of the significance of that word.""
Proposal Under the Bill
The Administration has therefore sought to ensure that the benefit of all
other sexual offences be extended to married women by retaining the term
"unlawful sexual intercourse" in those offences, but defining the term expressly,
in a new section 117(1B), to include:
"sexual intercourse between a husband and wife if:
(a) at the time of the intercourse the wife does not consent to it; and
(b) the husband knows, at the time of the intercourse, that his wife does
not consent to it or he is reckless as to whether she consents to it".
The definition will apply to all sexual offences in Part XII of the Crimes
Ordinance52 in which the term "unlawful sexual intercourse" is used either
4' Supplemental Paper for the LegCo Panel on the Administration of Justice and Legal Services: Marital Rape
and Related Sexual Offences, June 2001, para 6, available at the website of the Legislative Council at:
http://www.legco.hk/english/index.htm (under "Proposed Legislation") (site visited 10 Oct 2001).
50 A point which the Administration continually stressed throughout the Consultation Period, eg Sum-
mary and Consideration of Responses (n 14 above), para 7.05.
51 Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law (London, Edinburgh, Dublin: Butterworths, 1999), 9th edn, p 46 1.
5 Note that the Mental Health Ordinance (Cap 136) also uses the term "unlawful sexual intercourse"
in s 65 (unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman patient) and s 65A (unlawful sexual intercourse
with women under guardianship). By defining the term for the purposes of Part XII of the Crimes
Ordinance only, the meaning which will be given to the term in the context of the Mental Health
Ordinance remains unclear.
(2001) HKLJ424 Robyn Emerton
HeinOnline -- 31 Hong Kong L.J. 424 2001
Marital Rape and Related Sexual Offences 425
directly, or indirectly through the use of the term "unlawful sexual act"
(since this term is defined in section 117(1A) to include "unlawful sexual
intercourse"). There are 16 such offences in total, including procuring an
unlawful sexual act through threats (section 119) or false pretences
(section 120); administering drugs to obtain or facilitate an unlawful sexual
act (section 121); and having unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under
13 (section 123), a girl under 16 (section 124) and a mentally incapaci-
tated person (section 125).1
By examining these six key offences as they apply between husband and
wife, certain problems with the new definition of "unlawful sexual intercourse"
proposed in the Bill will become clear. 4 Some of these problems have been
creatively resolved in the Bill, while others remain in need of further review
and amendment.
Problems with the New Definition of "Unlawful Sexual Intercourse"
The new definition of "unlawful sexual intercourse" will require the pro-
secution to prove in relation to each of the offences mentioned above that, as
between husband and wife, (a) the wife did not consent to sexual intercourse
and (b) her husband knew or was reckless as to that fact - in other words, the
same consent-based elements which must be proved by the prosecution in
relation to the offence of rape.
Requirement to prove lack of consent
The introduction of these two consent-based elements into sections 119-
121 and sections 123-125, even if only in relation to situations involving
husband and wife, appears to be contrary to the historical basis of these offences.
This was to provide alternative, lesser offences to rape; offences which ap-
plied regardless of any apparent consent.
Whilst the English common law has recognised certain circumstances
in which a charge of rape can be substantiated where apparent consent
5 The other offences are: abducting an unmarried girl under the age of 18 for unlawful sexual inter-
course (s 127); abducting a mentally incapacitated person for an unlawful sexual act (s 128); procuring
a girl under the age of 21 or a mentally incapacitated person to have unlawful sexual intercourse with
a third party (ss 132 and 133); and various offences relating, broadly, to third parties procuring,
controlling, detaining or permitting others to be on their premises for the purposes of prostitution
(ss 130, 134, 135, 140, 141 and 142).
5 A number of concerns were raised about the new definition during the consultation process. However,
the Administration argued that as the definition was non-exhaustive, technically it did not prevent
any other meaning of "unlawful" from being applied in these sections as may be appropriate to the
particular case. See, for example, Summary and Consideration of Responses (n 14 above), para 7.01.
However, in this author's view, it seems highly unlikely in practice that a court presiding over a case
involving sexual intercourse between a husband and wife would depart from an express definition of
"unlawful sexual intercourse" in the Crimes Ordinance in favour of an alternative meaning.
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was given to sexual intercourse, these circumstances are very limited. They
are: where the woman's consent was obtained through threats of violence
or other serious threats;55 where she was deceived as to the identity of the
person she had agreed to have sexual intercourse with;" or where she was
deceived as to the nature of the act.57
Rape charges have also been successfully brought where the prosecution
was able to prove that a child or woman was not capable of consenting to
sexual intercourse due to age" or mental incapacity59 and, therefore, that
her apparent consent did not constitute valid consent. However, the law
does not provide an age under which a child or young woman is deemed
incapable of consenting for the purposes of rape, nor is there a definition of
(in)capacity to consent. Rather, incapacity to consent has to be proved on
the facts of each case - even in relation to a child as young as six or seven
years old. For example, in R v Howard,60 where the accused had had sexual
intercourse with a child aged six, the Court of Appeal held that the judge
in the first instance had misdirected the jury by instructing them that, as a
matter of law, a child of six years of age cannot give consent to sexual inter-
course (although notwithstanding this, the conviction was upheld).' In R
v Watson-Sweeney,6 the court of first instance acquitted the defendant of
the rape of a seven year old child, accepting the defendant's argument that
the child had consented and that the consent was valid on the basis that
her statement that "she knew what mummies and daddies did in bedrooms"
showed sufficient understanding of what was involved.63 Nor is there any
5 Although the Court of Appeal upheld a conviction for rape which did not involve force or threats or
fear of force in R v Olugboja [1981] 3 All ER 443, it is not yet clear what kinds of threat, other than
threats of violence, will be sufficient to negate consent for the purposes of the offence of rape.
56 Eg, R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23. Section 118(2) of the Crimes Ordinance also specifically states
that a man who induces a woman to have sexual intercourse with him by impersonating her husband
commits rape.
57 Eg, R v Flattery (1877) 2 QBD 410. In this case, the woman was persuaded that she was submitting to
an operation, rather than to sexual intercourse.
5 Eg, R v Harting [1938] 1 All ER 307, R v Lang [1975] 62 Cr App R50 and R v Howard 11965] 3 All ER
684.
59 Eg, R v Barratt (1973) LRCLC R 81.
60 [1965] 3 ALL ER 684.
61 The Court of Appeal stated that "it would be idle for anyone to suggest that a girl of that age had
insufficient understanding and knowledge to decide whether to consent or resist", ibid., at 685.
62 Unreported, The Times, 17 Dec 1983, as discussed in Temkin J, Rape and the Legal Process (London:
Sweet and Maxwell, 1987), p 72.
63 Broadly, the tests which have developed in relation to a child's capacity to consent to sexual inter-
course are whether the child "understood her situation and was capable of making up her mind", R v
Lang (1975) 62 Cr App R 50, or that she had "sufficient understanding and knowledge to decide
whether to consent or resist", R v Howard [1965], 3 All ER 684, 685. However, the cases give little
guidance as to what type of understanding or knowledge is required. See further UK Home Office,
Setting the Boundaries, Reforming the Law on Sex Offences: Volume 2: Supporting Evidence (London:
Home Office, July 2000), pp 94-96 and 135-138, also available at the website of the Home Office at:
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/cpd/sou/volmain2.htm (site visited 10 Oct 2001).
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definition of when a person is mentally incapable of consenting in the con-
text of rape; incapacity needs to be proved on a case-by-case basis."
Over time, certain circumstances were acknowledged in which a charge
of rape could not be substantiated at common law, but which nonetheless
required the protection of the criminal law. Thus, according to Smith and
Hogan:
"The meaning given to 'consent' in rape left a number of cases where
consent was in some way imperfect, but which were not crimes at common
law. The law has therefore been supplemented by several statutory crimes
involving sexual intercourse where consent has been improperly obtained by
threat, false pretences or the administration of drugs, or where the woman,
though consenting in fact is deemed by the law to be incompetent to consent
on account of age or mental handicap."65
These supplementary statutory offences (of which the six key offences iden-
tified above are examples) were therefore designed to be non-consent based
offences. The Bill's introduction of a consent-based definition of unlawful
sexual intercourse into these offences in the context of husband and wife is
therefore inconsistent with their historical basis.
Higher evidentiary standard on married women than unmarried women
The introduction of consent-based elements into these offences, as between
husband and wife, also imposes a higher evidentiary requirement on married
women than unmarried women. In addition to establishing all the other ele-
ments of these offences, married women will have to prove that they did not
consent to the sexual intercourse, and that their husband knew, or was reck-
less as to their lack of consent. Thus, married persons will receive less protection
from the law under these offences than unmarried persons.66
In relation to sections 119-121 (procuring unlawful sexual acts, including
unlawful sexual intercourse, through threats, false pretences or the adminis-
tration of drugs), the Administration recognised this as a valid concern and
made several proposals to address the point during the consultation exercise.
64 In relation to a person's mental capacity to consent to sexual intercourse, the authorities are ex-
tremely outdated and conflicting. The most frequently cited cases in this context date from the
1800s. Willes J held in R v Fletcher (1859) Bell CC 63, 70 that a 13 year old mentally disabled girl
consented to sexual intercourse even if she acted out of mere "animal instinct", whilst Palles CB in
the later case of R v Dee (1884) 15 Cox CC 579 found this view "abhorrent" and held, at p 594, that
consent, being the act of a man, and not that of an animal, must "proceed from the will sufficiently
enlightened by the intellect to make such consent the act of a reasoned being". See further Home
Office, Setting the Boundaries: Volume 2 (n 63 above), pp 94-96 and 135-138.
65 Criminal Law (n 51 above), p 46 2 .
66 This argument was particularly well developed by Sin Wai Man, Lecturer, School of Law, City Uni-
versity of Hong Kong in his correspondence with the Administration, eg letter dated 28 Nov 2000
(copy on file with the author).
Vol 31 Part 3
HeinOnline -- 31 Hong Kong L.J. 427 2001
The final proposal set out in the Bill includes the term "marital intercourse"
as an alternative to "unlawful sexual act" in each of sections 119, 120 and 121.
For example, section 119, as amended, now reads:
"A person who procures another person, by threats or intimidation, to do
an unlawful sexual act or marital intercourse in Hong Kong or elsewhere
shall be guilty of an offence ... " (proposed amendment underlined.)
In the case of married persons, it will therefore be sufficient for the pros-
ecution to prove procurement by threats or intimidation to have marital
intercourse. Although this new term is not defined, on a literal interpretation,
it would not require proof of lack of consent and knowledge (including
recklessness) of the absence of such consent, unlike the new definition of
"unlawful sexual intercourse". Therefore, whilst it is linguistically clumsy and
potentially confusing,"7 the proposed amendment should in practice provide
parity in the application of sections 119, 120 and 121 to married women and
unmarried women, as well as staying true to the historical basis of these
offences."
However, this alternative reference to "marital intercourse" has not been
extended in the Bill to section 123 (unlawful sexual intercourse with girls
under the age of 13) or section 125 (unlawful sexual intercourse with women
who are mentally incapacitated). 69 Therefore, the new consent-based defini-
tion of "unlawful sexual intercourse" will apply to these offences, as between
husband and wife.
It is accepted that these offences are rarely likely to be invoked in relation
to married children, since it is not possible to marry a child under the age of
16 under Hong Kong law.70 However, they will apply to children who have
validly married under a foreign jurisdiction, and to women who are mentally
67 It is submitted that the phrase "have marital intercourse" would be clearer. Also, the term "unlawful
sexual act" still remains as an alternative, which is highly confusing where the offence involves
married persons, since the term "unlawful sexual act" now invokes consent-based elements, yet the
term "marital intercourse" applies regardless of consent.
68 Indeed, the result should be the same as that achieved by amendment to the equivalent sections to
ss 119 and 120 in the English legislation, where the word "unlawful" was deleted from "unlawful
sexual intercourse" (although note that, rather oddly, the equivalent to s 121 in the English legisla-
tion was not amended). As the Crimes Ordinance uses the term "unlawful sexual act" in these sections,
the same neat amendment was not possible (nor indeed, was the deletion of the word "unlawful"
from any section other than s 118 permitted under the current exercise), hence the Administration's
proposal.
69 Note that there is a marital defence to s 124 (unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of
16), so the issues raised by the new definition of "unlawful sexual intercourse" will only arise in the
context of this section if the marriage defence fails.
70 See s 27(2) of the Marriage Ordinance (Cap 181), which states that "a marriage shall be null and void
if ... either party to the marriage is at the time of its celebration under the age of 16 years".
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incapacitated at the time of marriage, or become mentally incapacitated after
marriage.71
In its Paper for the House Committee Meeting of the Legislative Council
on 6 July 2001, the Administration stated that as it did not propose to amend
sections 123 and 125, it had not clarified its policy in respect of them.72
However, this overlooks the impact of the new definition of "unlawful sexual
intercourse" on these offences, which, in this author's view, has underlying
policy implications warranting further review.
The Underlying Policy Implications of the Bill
As discussed above, the effect of the new definition of "unlawful sexual inter-
course" will be to require the prosecution to prove in relation to married
children, and to married women who are mentally incapacitated, that (a) the
wife did not consent (or, on the facts of the particular case was incapable of
consenting), and (b) her husband knew or was reckless as to the lack of consent.
Since these are the same consent-based elements that must be proved in rela-
tion to rape, the new definition will deprive married women and children of
the additional protection otherwise afforded by the lesser offences of sec-
tions 123 and 125, which are not consent-based.
Of course, if married women and children do not currently benefit from
the protection of sections 123 and 125, then the Administration would be
correct in stating that no policy issues are involved in relation to these of-
fences under the Bill. However, it is clear from the drafting of sections 123
and 125 that these offences were intended to apply regardless of the marital
status of the parties.
The basis for this assertion is that the legislature provided an express
defence of marriage in relation only to the offence of unlawful sexual inter-
course with a girl under the age of 16 (section 124). This defence applies if
the man reasonably believed that he was married to the girl (notwithstanding
the fact that the marriage was invalid under Hong Kong law), and, pursu-
ant to an amendment proposed by the Bill, if the girl consented to the
sexual intercourse.
However, section 123 (unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under 13)
does not contain such a defence, it simply states that "a man who has unlawful
71 Note that a marriage to a person who, at the time, was not capable of consenting on the grounds of
mental incapacity, is merely voidable (and not automatically void) pursuant to s 20(2)(c) and s 20
(2)(d) of the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance (Cap 179). A marriage to a person who becomes men-
tally incapacitated after marriage is not voidable; nor is mental incapacity a ground for divorce under
s 11 A of the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance, unless the respondent has behaved in such a way that
the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent (s 11 A(2)(b)), or the par-
ties have lived apart for a continuous period of two years, for example, if the spouse who is mentally
ill has lived in an institution (s I A(2)(d)).
72 LC Paper No LS 136/00-01, paras 6 and 7, available at the website of the Legislative Council at:
http://www.legco.hk/english/index.htm (under "Legislative Proposals") (site visited 10 Oct 2001).
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sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 13 shall be guilty of an offence
and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life".
This clearly indicates that sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 13
was intended to be an offence, regardless of her marital status. However, in
responding to this point during the consultation process, the Administration
cited the English case of Alhaji Mohamed v Knott" as authority for the pro-
position that there may be a defence of marriage at common law even if the
girl is under the age of 13," and drew on Smith and Hogan's comment to this
effect." However, since Alhaji Mohamed concerned a girl aged 13 and 2 weeks,
and was therefore decided under the equivalent of section 124 (unlawful sexual
intercourse with a girl under 16)76 rather than the equivalent of section 123
(unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under 13),n1 it seems to be rather weak
authority for this position. In any event, as this author argued in response to
the Administration, it is imperative to determine as a matter of public policy
whether sexual intercourse with a girl under 13 should be an offence, regard-
less of consent or marital status, rather than leave this issue open.78
Similarly, section 125 (unlawful sexual intercourse with a mentally inca-
pacitated woman) does not contain a marriage defence,79 and was therefore
obviously intended to apply regardless of the marital status of the parties.ao
It therefore appears that, through the definition of "unlawful sexual
intercourse", married women and children will no longer receive the protec-
tion previously afforded to them by sections 123 and 125. Rather, these lesser
offences will become identical to the offence of rape, requiring lack of con-
sent / incapacity to consent and knowledge or recklessness as to the lack of
consent, to be proved on a case-by-case basis.
Duplication and anomalies
This duplication is also likely to lead to further problems. Whilst the Admin-
istration expressed the view that it was necessary to provide the prosecution
with additional charging options where "marital rape" of children or mentally
incapacitated persons was involved," the duplication of the consent-based
7 [1969] 1 QB1 16.
7 Summary and Consideration of Responses (n 14 above), at para 7.03, p 11.
7 Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law (n 51 above), p 46 1.
76 Sexual Offences Act 1957, s 6.
7 Ibid., s 5.
78 Letter to the Administration, dated 18 Apr 2001 (on file with the author).
79 However, s 125 does provide a defence where the man did not know and had no reason to suspect the
woman to be a mentally incapacitated person.
80 Oddly, s 118E, which was added to the Crimes Ordinance in 1991, expressly provides a marriage
defence to the offence of anal intercourse with a mentally incapacitated person; yet in none of the
previous amendment exercises was a marriage defence ever added to ss 123 or 125.
81 Legal Policy Division, Department of Justice, Discussion Paper: Proposed Amendments to the Crimes
Ordinance (Cap 200): Marital Rape and Related Sexual Offences, Mar 2001, para 11(3) (on file with the
author).
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elements of rape into the lesser offences of unlawful sexual intercourse under
sections 123 and 125 seems likely to result in confusion as to which offence
should be charged in these circumstances. In addition, there are potentially
harmful consequences if a charge of unlawful sexual intercourse rather than
rape is pursued.82 First, less social stigma is attached to a conviction of unlaw-
ful sexual intercourse than rape, and second, in relation to unlawful sexual
intercourse with a wife who is mentally incapacitated, the penalty under sec-
tion 125 is only 10 years' imprisonment, compared to life imprisonment for
rape under section 118. (However, the penalty under section 123 is the same
as for rape.) Both of these give the impression that a man who has non-con-
sensual sexual intercourse with his wife should be treated more leniently if
she is a child or a mentally incapacitated person. This is highly questionable.
Finally, from a legal perspective, anomalies may arise if the case law develops
differently under these different sections, for example, as to the test to be
applied in establishing (in)capacity to consent.
Required policy decisions
The better approach, in this author's view, is for sections 123 and 125 (and
indeed all other sexual offences using the term "unlawful sexual intercourse")"
to be reviewed individually, and for policy decisions to be made as to whether
each section should apply absolutely to husband and wife, regardless of consent
(as they do for unmarried persons) or whether they should not apply between
husband and wife at all, leaving all non-consensual sexual intercourse to be
dealt with exclusively under section 118 (rape). Clear legislative amendment
would be required to reflect these policy decisions, including, for example, the
deletion of the word "unlawful" from relevant sections.
Recommendations under recent law reform proposals in Australia and the
United Kingdom
In making such policy decisions, the legislature could usefully draw upon
the ways in which the United Kingdom and Australia, both of which are
currently undertaking a wholesale reform of their sexual offences legislation,
have approached these issues.84
82 Particularly given that a judge does not have the jurisdiction to convict a defendant of rape where he
has been charged with unlawful sexual intercourse (nor indeed, under s 149 of the Crimes Ordinance,
to convict a defendant of unlawful sexual intercourse where he has been charged and acquitted of
rape).
83 For comprehensiveness, this review should be conducted of all such offences in both the Crimes
Ordinance and the Mental Health Ordinance (see n 52 above).
84 Law reform commissions in other countries, such as South Africa, are also undertaking similar com-
prehensive reforms of their sexual offences legislation, see Project 107: Sexual Offences: Discussion
Paper 25: Sexual Offences, the Substantive Law (South Africa: South Africa Law Commission, 1999)
available online at: http://www.law.wits.ac.za/salc/salc.html (site visited 10 Oct 2001).
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Sexual intercourse (and other sexual activity) with a wife under the age of 13
In the interests of protecting children, a clear public policy decision is re-
quired as to whether there should be an age, for example, 13, below which a
child is deemed incapable of giving consent to sexual intercourse in all
circumstances, including if she is married under the laws of a foreign
jurisdiction. This also needs to be considered in relation to other sexual of-
fences such as indecent assault and gross indecency, since the law in Hong
Kong is currently based on the premise that married children under 16 can
validly consent to indecent assault (section 122) and to gross indecency
(section 146). There is no lower age limit at which incapacity to consent is
assumed.
In the United Kingdom, the Home Office has recommended that whilst
marriage should remain a defence to sexual intercourse with a girl under 16, it
should not be a defence to sexual intercourse with a girl under 13, nor to the
various new sexual offences recommended by it."5 In Australia, the Model
Criminal Code Officers Committee has recommended that an age be set
(originally, somewhat controversially, at 10 years) under which no defences,
including marriage and consent, will be available to any sexual offences (the
"no defences age").86
Sexual intercourse (and other sexual activity) with a "mentally incapacitated" wife
A potentially much more difficult policy issue is that relating to sexual inter-
course between married persons where one party is mentally incapacitated - or
as the current legislation stands, where the wife is mentally incapacitated."
The question is whether the law should deem that a mentally incapacitated
person is incapable of giving consent to sexual intercourse (as currently appears
to be the case under section 125), or whether this should be decided on a case-
by-case basis (as will be the case under the proposed amendments in the Bill).
The same applies to other sexual activities with mentally incapacitated persons.
These are currently dealt with very inconsistently under the Ordinance. For
example, a mentally incapacitated woman can give valid consent to anal inter-
course with her husband (section 118E) but not to indecent assault by her
husband (section 122).
85 Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the Law on Sexual Offences: Volume I (London: Home Office, 2000),
paras 3.5.8 to 3.5.11, pp 42-43 and paras 3.6.17 to 3.6.12, p 48. Also available at the website of the
Home Office at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/cpd/sou/vollmain.pdf (site visited 10 Oct 2001).
86 Model Criminal Code: Chapter 5: Sexual Offences Against the Person: Report (Australia: Model Crimi-
nal Code Officers Committee,1999), p 143. Also available at the website of the Australian
Attorney-General's Department, Australian Law On-line, at: http://law.gov.au/publications/
ModelCriminal Code/sexual.pdf (site visited 10 Oct 2001).
87 There are a number of sexual offences in the Crimes Ordinance which still remain gender-specific,
despite others being made gender-neutral through the legislative amendment exercise in 1991. This
is another issue which needs to be addressed in the context of a comprehensive reform of the sexual
offences legislation.
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Various law reform bodies in different countries have grappled with the
problem of striking a balance in the legislation between, on the one hand,
protecting those with severe mental disabilities against sexual abuse and
exploitation, and on the other, respecting the private lives, including sexual
lives, of persons with less severe mental disabilities. The UK Home Office
has proposed an express definition of capacity to consent for the purposes of
all non-consensual sexual offences (including rape), which includes where a
person is, by reason of mental disability, unable to make a decision for
themselves, for example, where he or she is unable to understand the nature
and reasonably foreseeable consequences of the act."8 In addition, it has rec-
ommended that there should be a specific alternative offence to rape in respect
of sexual activity with a person with such a severe mental disability that they
would not have the capacity to consent to sexual relations. This is intended
as a fail-safe recommendation should a rape charge be considered too severe
for the circumstances of the sexual activity, or where there is a real difficulty
in prosecuting rape." The UK Home Office felt that a marriage defence (or
de facto partnership defence) would be unacceptable in these circumstances.
90 However, the Australian Model Criminal Code Officers Committee reached
the opposite view that there must be defences based on marriage (and de facto
partnerships) in these circumstances.9 '
Views on what should be the appropriate position to adopt are also likely
to turn to the particular definition given to "mentally incapacitated persons",
for example, whether it relates only to those with extremely serious mental
impairments, or whether it also covers those with less serious mental
impairments. Currently, the term is somewhat problematically defined under
section 117 of the Crimes Ordinance to include persons whose mental disor-
der or handicap is such that they are incapable of living an independent life,
which is a different question altogether from whether they are capable of
giving consent to sexual intercourse.
Conclusion
The Bill's proposed amendments to section 118 of the Crimes Ordinance will
make it clear that marital rape is an offence, avoiding any uncertainties as to
whether the courts will apply R v R in Hong Kong. With an appropriate pub-
lic awareness campaign, this will send out a clear message to the public that
marital rape is a crime. This is to be welcomed. The proposed amendments
88 UK Home Office, Setting the Boundaries: Volume I (n 85 above), p 73 (for further discussion of this
issue, see para 4.5, pp 70-73).
89 UK Home Office, Setting the Boundaries: Volume I (n 85 above), para 4.6, pp 73-74.
90 Ibid., paras 4.6.5.
91 Model Criminal Code (n 86 above), pp 128-184.
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should also mean that the offences of procuring sexual acts through threats,
false pretences or the administration of drugs (sections 119-121) will apply
equally to married persons and non-married persons. In putting forward the
Bill, the Hong Kong government has taken an important first step towards
meeting its commitments under the CEDAW Convention to provide legisla-
tive (and other) protection against sexual violence against all women
irrespective of marital status, and the proposals should therefore receive strong
support.
However, the Administration's limited mandate has unfortunately pre-
vented a more comprehensive policy review of the sexual offences legislation,
even in the narrow context of its application to married persons. Whilst per-
haps on the face of it, the proposed definition of "unlawful sexual intercourse"
appears relatively harmless, it actually makes the sexual offences legislation
even more confusing and complex than before. More worryingly, it appears
to reduce the protection currently afforded to married children under 13 and
married women who are mentally incapacitated. The prosecution will now
have to prove lack of consent / incapacity to consent in relation not only to
rape, but also in relation to the supposedly lesser offences of unlawful sexual
intercourse under sections 123 and 125. This duplication could also lead to
anomalies in charging and sentencing, and to anomalies in the development
of the law under the different offences. In this author's view, this is an area
which urgently requires proper policy review and amendment, a process which
has unfortunately been side-stepped in the current limited exercise.
Even though the discussion has been limited to the application of the
sexual offences legislation to married persons, it has hopefully demonstrated
the urgent need for a comprehensive review and reform of the sexual offences
legislation in Hong Kong. Partly due to its piecemeal development over the
last 30 years, the legislation relating to sexual offences has become cumber-
some and confusing and in some cases either inconsistent or archaic. In many
other cases, it is discriminatory, whether on the grounds of marital status,
gender or sexual orientation. It is time, therefore, for Hong Kong to follow
the lead taken by the United Kingdom, Australia and other jurisdictions, and
to modernise and strengthen the law in this area, thereby bringing its sexual
offences legislation into the 21st century.
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